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PROTECTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST
IN LABOR DISPUTES

Frank E. Cooper*
HERE exists gt;:neral agreement that an effective means
must be found, in the public interest, to curb strikes in basic
industries that imperil the national health or safety. This principle, indeed, has been a part of our basic law for more than a
decade. The trouble has been that the limited means provided
to meet this need fail to give effective expression to the public interest. The only significant remedy is that which the steel strike
has made so well known: an 80-day injunction followed by an election in which the employees may indicate for publicity purposes
whether they wish to accept the employer's last offer rather than
continue the strike.
How are we to bring the force of public opinion to bear, in the
search for labor peace? This question is at the heart of the most
impelling domestic problem facing the United States today.
In the feverish crisis brought on by the 1959-60 strikes, many
suggested answers were urged. The trouble with most of them is
that they do not reflect enough of the facets of that many-sided
composite of views which, in total, represents the true public
interest.
Three principal proposals have been widely urged as offering
a solution to our present unhappy situation. These are (1) bringing "public representatives" into the bargaining process; (2)
making the antitrust laws applicable to labor unions; (3) creating
"labor courts" with powers of compulsory arbitration.
These three proposals may be separately examined, in light
of the one underlying test: will they effectively subserve the public
interest in fair settlement of industrial disputes?
Then, in light of the inadequacies of these proposals, as disclosed by such examination, a new approach will be suggested
which, it is believed, may be effective to protect the interests of
employees, employers, and - most important - the general public.

T

I.

THE PUBLIC CANNOT BE BROUGHT INTO THE

BARGAINING PROCESS

One frequently-voiced suggestion is that a panel of "public
representatives" be brought into the bargaining process. This is a
• Of the Detroit Bar; Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
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comparatively simple and superficially attractive device - it would
appear to offer a method of bringing representatives of the public
interest right into the negotiating rooms, to sit at the head of the
bargaining table.
But history has shown that this approach does not work. In
World War II, labor disputes were submitted to tri-partite panels
of War Labor Board members, comprising equal numbers of labor
union officials, representatives of company management, and
"public members." All had an equal vote, and the public members had the balance of power. But that power was exercised, in
too many cases, to effectuate motives that were less than idealistic.
It is inevitable that it should be so.
The "public members" did not really represent the public in any
true sense. They perforce carried with them into the performance
of their task whatever social and economic ideologies they had
acquired in their work-a-day jobs. A typical three-member "public" panel might be comprised of a college professor, a holder of
public office, and a professional arbitrator. They could accomplish some good by bringing to bear the views of three individuals
not directly involved in the particular dispute; but they could not
speak for a hundred million Americans, any more than could a
panel composed of your letter-carrier, your minister, and your family doctor. The best they could do was seek to work out some
compromise and persuade two of the other six members of the
Board (three "labor" and three "management") to vote for it.
Many criticisms were directed toward the public members of
the War Labor Board panels. Sometimes it was asserted that their
dominant philosophy was that of peace at any price. Often, the
"public" members were accused of being too sympathetic to the
demands of organized labor. Sometimes, they were accused in
union publications of being too "management minded." It was
asserted from time to time that particular disputes were settled
on the basis of political deals, rather than on the basis of an intelligent, high-minded, and fully-informed appraisal of what the
public interest demanded in a particular conflict.
The War Labor Board experience strongly argues that no small
group of men can be selected who possess, singly or collectively,
the wisdom that would be needed to divine what settlement of a
particular labor dispute would best serve the public interest. Can
you think of any three men endowed with the prescience to foresee
what terms of settlement of the steel strike of 1959 would have been
best for all the people directly or indirectly affected?
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The most that "public members" can do is to serve as a catalytic
to compromise. Just as in chemical reactions the catalytic agent
sometimes forms intermediate compounds that decompose, too
often the intermediate compromises hammered out in fear of an
imminent strike have little permanency. They provide only a
stop-gap solution. More is needed.
II.

THE ANTITRUST LAws ARE INADEQUATE To MEET
THE PUBLIC NEED

A second proposal, and one which has wide popular appeal,
is to make the antitrust laws applicable to labor unions. However, only the most optimistic can find much comfort in this suggestion. The chief difficulty may be briefly summarized thus:
While the proposal is based on premises that are logically valid,
no one has as yet been ingenious enough to devise a practical
method of applying antitrust sanctions to the monopolistic practices of labor unions. In short, the theory is good, but its practical
application involves difficulties not yet solved. The reasons for
these two conclusions may be separately stated.
First, the proposals are based on premises that are logically
valid. Many of the larger labor unions do in fact possess monopolistic power. Through their control of the labor supply, they
are able to, and in too numerous instances have in fact engaged in
restrictive practices tending to fix prices artificially high, to restrict production, to prevent entry by newcomers into certain fields
of trade and commerce, and to restrain competition. These are
the classic hall-marks of monopoly power. For more than a half
century, business concerns exercising such powers have been subject to severe criminal and civil penalties. There is no logical
reason why similar legal restraints should not be imposed, in the
public interest, on labor unions engaged in restraint of trade or
other monopolistic practices. On the contrary, elementary ideals
of fair play strongly urge that the same rules of law should apply
to managers of labor as apply to managers of corporate enterprise.
Second, despite the logical validity of the proposal that antitrust laws should be made applicable to labor unions (as, indeed,
they had been for many years until the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader1 ), there are
practical difficulties in applying them.
1310 U.S. 469 (1940).
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First, and probably foremost, is the circumstance that the remedies utilized to compel businesses to avoid monopolistic practices
are inappropriate to the case of the union monopoly. The antitrust laws authorize the courts to enter certain types of order only.
Such orders are well adapted to correct the harm caused when
business management violates the antitrust laws. But they would
not work well, if applied to the situation that results when unions
violate antitrust principles.
For example, if the bigness of a corporation is utilized as a
means of accomplishing improper objectives, the courts can order
a divestiture - can order a big company carved up into smaller
ones, which then (for such is the nature of business) compete
vigorously with each other, each striving to earn the most money
for its owners. But it would scarcely be practicable to split up a
big union, like the United Steel Workers or the United Auto Workers. For one thing, the court would not know along what lines
it should be split up - whether it should be along geographical
lines, or whether there should be a separate union for each type of
industry, or whether perhaps the size of the unions should be patterned to fit the size of the companies in the industry.
More important, one wonders what good would be accomplished by splitting up a union. Allied unions do not compete
with each other. Would not a dozen small U.A.W. unions voluntarily adopt programs of joint action and mutual assistance so
effective that their combined monopolistic powers would continue
unabated? One fears that the chief result of divestiture would
be to increase the number of full-time, paid union officers, and
increase other administrative expenses, with the result that each
worker would have to pay more union dues without receiving
any corresponding benefit.
Similarly, injunctive relief is well adapted to antitrust violations by businesses; but it would not be appropriate in cases where
unions violate the antitrust principles. For example, if a group of
companies agree to fix prices, or to divide territories, this can readily be stopped by means of an injunction forbidding them from
continuing this practice, on pain of fines and jail sentences. But
how would the injunction be framed where unions were defendants? One of the most potent monopolistic weapons of the big
union is the practice of throttling a small business by a picket line,
to compel the employer to accept unreasonable and unduly burdensome demands. Could the union be enjoined from picketing?
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In an earlier day, when the federal courts construed the antitrust laws as applying to labor union activities, they did undertake by injunction to limit the picketing activities of unions. But
the results of these attempts were unsatisfactory; and a growing
public resentment led finally to the enactment of the Norris-La
Guardia Act, 2 which so drastically limited the powers of the federal
courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes as to make this device
practically a dead letter. Further, more recent decisions and legislation have recognized certain rights on the part of unions to picket,
subject to stated limitations. How, then, could injunctions be used
to enforce the antitrust laws against labor unions?
This brings us to the second basic practical difficulty encountered in any attempt to make the antitrust laws applicable to labor
unions. Many of the most effective monopolistic practices of the
unions are now protected by law. The antitrust laws could not
be made really effective as against unions, unless far-reaching
amendments were made in many other laws. An outstanding example is the device of compulsory membership. This means that
once a union wins a bargaining election in a plant, it can bargain
an agreement which requires that all employees in the plant, and
all who thereafter come to work there, must become dues-paying
members of the union in order to hold their jobs. Thus the union's
monopolistic powers over the labor supply in that plant become
self-perpetuating. This violates the theory of the antitrust laws.
But the legality of compulsory membership provisions has been
recognized for many years, and is now specifically protected by
statute.8
Similarly, the Taft-Hartley law specifically recognizes and protects the principle of "majority rule."4 This sounds like a democratic principle. But in practice it is something less than that. If,
for example, there are 500 employees in a plant and 300 of them
vote in a union election (a not unusual percentage) and 151 vote
in favor of union representation, the result is that thereafter the
47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §§101-115.
s Section 8 (a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §158 (a) (3), provides that it
shall not be an unfair labor practice to execute a "union shop" contract, requiring union
membership as a condition of employment. Elimination of earlier provisions, requiring
an affirmative vote of the employees affected as a condition precedent to the execution
of such an agreement, has in operation served to encourage the execution of such contracts,
notwithstanding the provisions of §14(b), 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §164(b),
that federal law shall not be construed as authorizing the execution of "union shop" contracts in states where such agreements are prohibited by state law.
4 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §159 (a).
2
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union which was favored by only 151 employees becomes the exclusive representative of all 500, with sole power to decide (by
collective bargaining) the conditions under which they shall work,
and the ways in which their grievances will be handled.
It would be impossible for the courts to prohibit, as violative
of the antitrust laws, practices which are specifically made legal by
other laws.
In short, while it can readily be agreed that the principle of the
antitrust laws should be made applicable to labor unions, the practical difficulties of applying the existing antitrust laws to monopolistic labor union practices are so great as to compel the conclusion that new legislation is needed.

III.

"LABOR COURTS"

ARE NO SUBSTITUTE

FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The third principal suggestion proposes to give effect to the
public interest in the settlement of labor disputes by submitting
them to a "labor court." Since the American courts have done so
well in settling all other kinds of disputes, it is said, they could
presumably do equally well in the area of labor disputes. Imbued
only with a desire to obtain equal justice for all, it is argued, the
courts could determine the rights and obligations of the parties
impartially and fairly.
This suggestion is specious. The so-called "labor court" would
not be a court at all, but only a dignified name for a group of arbitrators. Courts sit only to determine legal controversies, which can
be solved by application and adaption of statutes and common-law
rules. But there are no statutes or common-law rules that tell us
whether a group of employees deserve a wage increase (and if so,
how much and how soon) or whether management should have a
right to cut out "featherbedding" practices under which some employees are paid for not working. There are no legal rights and
wrongs in these areas. Such questions must be settled by negotiation and bargaining- or by arbitration. The term "labor court,"
in short, would be merely a euphemistic description of a process of
compulsory arbitration. Will compulsory arbitration answer the
problem? Surely not.
The whole idea of being compelled to submit to the ad hoc discretionary judgment of an arbitrator (or even three or four arbitrators) on such basic issues as wages or management prerogative is
anathema to the managers of unions as well as to the managers of
business. Neither unions nor companies would be willing to sub-
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mit to compulsory arbitration. This by itself may be unimportant,
for the rights of the public override those of both contesting parties.
But it does appear a bit naive to talk seriously of passing a law
which would be unanimously opposed by both unions and companies, and presumably by the rest of the public as well. Further,
there are substantial doubts as to the constitutionality of a law that
would provide for compulsory arbitration.
More important still, the idea of compulsory arbitration is at
odds with fundamental concepts of our democratic society. Should
any man, or any group of men, be vested with plenipotentiary
power to tell a group of employees that they must continue to work
without any wage increase although they would rather not work at
all than continue without an increase, or to tell a company that it
must give up its right to determine the products it will manufacture, or perhaps to impose a retirement plan that is unwanted by
either employees or employer? Instinctively, most Americans
would say "No." Substitution of arbitrary discretion for the give
and take of collective bargaining is not in keeping with American
traditions, which have long recognized and respected the collective
bargaining process. Yet this is what any process of compulsory arbitration would involve. America is not ready for it - not yet, at
least.
IV.

SUGGESTIONS POINTING TO A SURER SOLUTION

There are two time-tested principles, consistent with democratic American traditions, that have been quite overlooked in all
the debates as to how in the public interest we can avoid the disruptions of the national economy that too often accompany major industrial disputes.

A.

The Public Should Be Told the Facts

The first of these principles recognizes that, as John Galsworthy
said long ago, "Public opinion's always in advance of the Law."
When all the facts of the case are made fully known to the public,
there emerges with amazing speed a crystallized public opinion that
truly represents all facets of our great populace. As it emerges, it
often is indeed in "advance of the Law," as the poet said. But,
because it is the true public opinion, and recognized as such by
Congress, it possesses amazing power to modernize the law. Amendments can be enacted speedily when public demand for a change
is felt.
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An outstanding instance of the genius of the American people,
once all the facts are placed before them, to arrive at a common
judgment as to what changes in the law are required (and speedily
to obtain enactment of such changes) is afforded by the Labor Reform Law of 1959.5 In the early months of 1959, it was commonly
conceded by practically all who professed special knowledge in the
matter that none of the pending labor reform bills could be passed
at the 1959 Session of Congress. The union lobbies were exerting
such powerful opposition, it was said, that not even a mild bill
could be passed. However, in the course of a few weeks, as the reports of the McClellan Committee reached their startling conclusions, and were carried by newspaper and radio throughout the
Nation, the public, aroused by the frank and shocking disclosure
of the facts, demanded action and got it. The enactment of the farsweeping provisions of the 1959 law was made possible only because
of the force of an aroused public opinion, and the public was
aroused only because all the facts involved had been made public
knowledge.
Is it not fair to assume that if all the facts involved in a dispute
between, say, the United Steelworkers and the major steel companies were made known to the public there would be formulated
a public opinion as to what settlement terms were right and just
and fair for the Nation as a whole? Is it not fair to assume that the
companies and the union would be just as heedful of the true
public opinion, so expressed, as was the Congress?
On these assumptions it is urged that the first step toward a
surer solution of the problem is to adopt an effective method of letting the public know all the facts involved in a labor dispute of
sufficient stature to imperil the national well-being.
B.

Modern Governmental Techniques Should Be
Brought To Bear

The second time-tested principle that should be reexamined in
the present exigency is that which recognizes the special ability of
administrative agencies to serve certain governmental purposes
more efficiently than do the traditional judicial and legislative
organs. Nearly seventy-five years ago, the Interstate Commerce
Commission was created to work out solutions to baffling problems
connected with regulation of the railroads - problems that our
forefathers found as difficult and pressing as today we :find the
5 73 Stat. 519 (1959), U.S.

CODE CONG.

and An.

NEWS

2953 (Sept. 14, 1959).
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problems of regulating labor-management relations. The Interstate Commerce Commission was empowered to exercise a combination of legislative, judicial and executive powers that enabled it
to proceed in an experimental fashion, trying several proposed solutions on a tentative basis until it hit upon one that worked satisfactorily. So well did this approach work as a means of hammering
out practical solutions to the problems of railroad regulation, that
the Interstate Commerce Commission Act became a pattern for
many subsequent congressional enactments. In 1914, there was
created a Federal Trade Commission charged with the duty of
preventing unfair and deceptive methods in competition. In later
years, a large number of federal administrative tribunals have been
created for the purpose of policing the minutiae of conduct in some
designated field affected by the public interest. Thus, the Securities and Exchange Commission supervises the issuance and sale of
stocks and bonds, to protect the public from deceptive practices in
the stock market. The Civil Aeronautics Board determines what
routes airplanes may fly, what companies shall operate such routes,
what planes may be used, and how much fare may be charged.
The Federal Communications Commission exercises a similar
supervisory control over radio and television. The Federal Power
Commission is guardian of the public interest in the production
and distribution of natural gas. The list could be extended. Several score additional examples could be cited where Congress found
it appropriate and necessary to create an administrative agency as
a means of providing continuous governmental supervision over
an area of activity where, in the public interest, regulation ·was
necessary.
Nearly a quarter of a century ago, Congress made a start in this
direction by creating a National Labor Relations Board. However, its powers were, on the whole, circumscribed somewhat narrowly. It was given power to determine, within prescribed limits,
how large or small a group of employees constituted an appropriate
"unit" for collective bargaining purposes, and to determine
whether a majority of the employees in such "unit" desired to be
represented by a union. It was given power to prevent the commission of specified unfair labor practices by employers and
(twelve years later) by unions. Its work, within the rather narrow
sphere of authority delegated to it, has won the respect of labor,
management, and the public. Its expertness in dealing with the
problems entrusted to it has been recognized by the United States
Supreme Court which in Phelps Dodge Gorp. v. National Labor
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Relations Board expressed its deference to the judgment of the
NLRB by explaining that in the field of labor relations "factors
outside our domain of experience may come into play." 6
But the Board has never been given a sphere of authority nearly
as broad in the field of labor relations as the authority delegated
to other agencies in their respective areas of regulation. Is it not
time to consider whether the NLRB (or some independent agency)
be given broader powers in this area?
C.

Implementing the Program

The two suggestions above made can readily be combined in a
single course of action.
An administrative agency could be created and vested with
powers to ascertain the facts involved in critical labor disputes and
the duty of disseminating such facts to the public. The same agency
could be given powers to exercise certain sanctions designed to
curb abuses of power by either of the contending parties and (by
making sure the desires and wishes of the individual employees
were recognized and protected) to promote the public interest in
the fair settlement of labor disputes affecting the national interest.
I.

Making the Facts Known

The steel strike of 1959-1960 furnishes a timely and excellent
example of the inability of the public - and, indeed, the employees
directly involved - to learn the facts bearing on the central issues
in dispute.
It is well known that one of the principal issues in the steel
strike concerned the "work rules." But what are the facts of the
case? One obtained the general impression from advertisements
published by the companies that they wished to restrain uneconomic "featherbedding" practices. The advertisements published
by the union warned of the loss of thousands of jobs if the companies won their point. But neither side, so far as the writer has
discovered, published a sufficient statement of the underlying
factual circumstances to permit the public to form a judgment on
the issues.
It may be assumed that most citizens are unsympathetic with
unnecessary "make work" practices whereby employees are paid
for not working or for performing useless tasks. It is fair to assume
also that public sympathy runs high for men about to lose jobs
6

313 U.S. 177 at 195 (1941).
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which have long been recognized as legitimate jobs. But, on the
basis of the fragmentary information available, the public had no
means of knowing which side was in the right.
If an accurate, complete, and impartial statement of all the
relevant facts had been made known, the public would have formed
its own conclusion as to how the dispute should have been resolved;
and there can be little doubt that the force of public opinion would
have powerfully influenced the negotiating teams, just as it influenced the Congress which, a few months earlier, was considering
a labor reform bill.
Consider, too, the plight of the employee. Had he been asked
to vote on whether he wished to accept the companies' offer, he
probably would not have known whether he was one of those who
would lose their jobs under the companies' proposal. How could
he intelligently decide how to vote? It would seem that at the very
least the employee whose future is vitally involved in the outcome of the dispute should be enabled to learn exactly what is
involved.
Presidential fact-finding commissions, given a few days to study
the situation, at a time when emotional feelings are running high,
cannot possibly do an adequate job. What is needed is a staff of
expert fact-finders who would work with both parties day in and
day out over a longer period of time, and who by careful study of
the pre-negotiation demands would be able to focus clearly upon
the facts lying at the heart of the dispute before they became confused in the heat of debate. If empowered to interrogate representatives of both parties, and to take testimony, and demand the production of evidence bearing upon the facts involved in the dispute,
such an agency could lay before the workers, and the general public
as well, a clear and authoritative picture of what was really involved
in the dispute. In the bright light of such fact-finding processes,
the employees affected could make an intelligent choice, and the
general public could adequately express its opinion as to how the
dispute ought to be resolved in the public interest.

2.

Protecting the Public Interest

The powers of the agency should not be restricted to fact-finding and publicizing. On the basis of the facts found, the agency
could be empowered by Congress to take appropriate action along
a number of lines designed to safeguard the collective bargaining
process and curb monopolistic abuses.
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(a) Bargaining Units. One of the most significant unsettled
issues in the field of labor relations concerns the question how big
the bargaining unit should be. We have all seen how industrywide bargaining can and often does produce crises that threaten
the national economic well-being. We have seen how (in the automobile industry, for example) bargaining on a company-wide
basis enables the union to adopt a "divide and conquer" strategy,
taking advantage of the fierce inter-company competition to
"knock off" the adversaries one at a time. It requires but little
imagination to conjecture what havoc could be wrought by a law
requiring each employer to bargain separately with its own employees. A group of thirty or forty small tool and die shops in a
single metropolitan area would be helpless to defend themselves
against the economic force of a single union representing all employees of all companies (even though separate bargaining teams
were set up on the basis of company units) unless the employers
were permitted to join forces for bargaining.
These few instances are enough to suggest that there is no single
pat answer as to how large a bargaining unit should be. In some
cases it should be larger; in others, smaller.
By authorizing a federal administrative agency to determine,
on a case-by-case basis, what bargaining unit would be appropriate
to protect the public interest by avoiding situations where unions
could exercise their economic power in a monopolistic fashion, it
might be possible to take long steps toward applying to the collective bargaining process the principle of the antitrust laws, and at
the same time promote democracy in collective bargaining.
(b) Strike Votes. The right of employees to strike has long
been protected by law. Should they not equally have a right not
to strike? Unfortunately, they do not now in fact have a right to
refrain from striking. If they are told by union officials that they
must strike, they have no real alternative but to follow their leader's
orders. Perhaps it would, as unions argue, hamstring the effectiveness of union bargaining strategy to adopt a law requiring that
there must always be a government-conducted strike vote before a
strike can be called. On the other hand, it must be conceded that
there are some cases where it would be most beneficial to the employees concerned, and to the general public as well, to let the
employees decide for themselves (in light of accurate, complete and
unbiased statements of the facts involved in the dispute) whether
or not they wished to go on strike.
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It is therefore suggested that the federal administrative agency
here proposed should have power, in those instances where it deems
such action appropriate in the public interest, to order that no
strike could be called unless a majority of all the employees in the
bargaining unit voted in favor of such action at a secret election
conducted by the government agency after the employees had been
fully informed of the issues involved and were apprised of all the
facts bearing on such issue.
If they voted against striking, collective bargaining would go
on, and the union would be in the same position that employers
now are. Employers cannot lock out - this is normally prohibited
by law. Similarly, the union, if its own members voted against
strike action, would have to bargain the issue out on the merits as
employers are now compelled to do. Neither side would be able
to say: "We won't play ball any more unless you will play our way."

(c) Miscellaneous Administrative Sanctions. If such an
agency were created it could be endowed with powers in appropriate cases to administer various administrative sanctions (not
unlike those now exercised by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Federal Communications Commission) designed to compel good faith bargaining between evenly-matched parties. It might, for example, be authorized
to prohibit "union shop" agreements in certain industries. It
might be empowered, subject to stated criteria, to limit and modify
the rule that the union is the exclusive representative of all employees, members and non-members alike. It might require in
appropriate cases that the union would be permitted to bargain
only for those employees who were union members, where this
appeared to be the only way of curbing union monopolies that
threatened the public interest. Again, it might be empowered,
where a bargaining deadlock in a basic industry threatened the
public interest, to determine that the provisions of any such new
agreement as might be negotiated could not be applied retroactively. This would be, indeed, an effective inducement to the
parties to settle their disagreements speedily.
All these are but illustrative examples of the way in which an
administrative tribunal, with appropriately described but clearly
limited powers, could help avoid crippling strikes without impairing the overall effectiveness of the collective bargaining process
which still appears to be our best hope for industrial peace. The
creation of such an agency would contemplate committing the
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collective bargaining process to evenly-matched teams who would
carry on their bargaining under conditions that would permit
employees, stockholders, and the general public to know the facts
that should be weighed in striking a bargain that would be fair to
all interested parties, the public included.

